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FIRST DAY 
VIRGINIA BOARD OF BAR EXAMINERS 
Roanoke, Virginia - June 24-25, 1968 
SECOND SECTION 
. 1. During the morning of May 14, 1968, Henry Frost went 
to a retail art shop of which Sam Pope was the proprietor. He 
saw displayed for sale several oil paintings, one of which was that 
of a reclining girl painted by a noted French artist. Frost feeling 
that the portrait would be much to the liking of his friend George 
Neal, and although he had never bought any paintings for Neal, took 
t upon himself to ask Pope the purchase price. When Pope replied 
hat the price was $400, Frost said 11 I am here on behalf of my good 
.riend George Neal, and he has authorized me to say that he will 
urchase this portrait at that price. You can consider it a sale, 
d on tomorrow George will come by and pick up the portrait and 
you the $400. 11 Frost then left the art shop. Later in the 
Hubert Kennedy went to the art shop and became charmed by the 
ftrait of the reclining girl. He asked Pope what the purchase 
ice was, and Pope, seeing a chance to improve on the price he had 
oted to Frost, replied that the price was $475. Kennedy there-
on wrote out his check for $475 payable to Pope, delivered it, 
left the art shop with the painting in his possession. When 
edy was out of sight, Pope telephoned Frost and told him to 
et the sale to Neal, that he had just sold the portrait to . 
edy. During the evening of the same day, Frost told Neal of 
arrangements he had made with Pope for Neal's purchase of the 
ait of the reclining girl, but did not tell Neal of the deal 
had later had with Kennedy. Neal expressed his delight, and 
ext morning he went to the art shop, tendered Pope his check 
400, and asked for the painting. Pope then told him that he 
old the painting to Kennedy the day before. Shortly thereafter 
brought an action against Pope in the Law and Equity Court 
e City of Richmond seeking damages of $500 for breach of 
ct. In his motion for judgment, Neal alleged the foregoing· 
Pope has demurred to the motion for judgment. 
How should the Court rule on the demurrer? 
2. Paul North, although nineteen years of age, had all the 
nee of an adult. He went to a jewelry store owned and 
d by Harold East, and expressed his admiration·or a diamond 
disp~ayed for sale at a price of $400. On being satisfied 
price was reasonable, North agreed with East to buy the 
the listed price, and to make full payment and take 
during the following week. Shortly after North left the 
. st learned from another customer that North was only 













asks your advice on whether he is bound by his agreement with 
North. 
What should your advice be? 
3. In April of 1968, Ideal Packaging Corp. purchased all 
the assets of Eastern Suppliers, Inc. The contract of sale provided, 
among other things, "Ideal hereby assumes all the rights and 
liabilities of Eastern with respect to unfilled orders for the 
purchase of materials contracted to be sold by Eastern." James 
Spencer, unknown to Ideal, had been a salesman for Eastern in the 
ichmond area and, at the time of the sale of its assets by 
astern, had procured purchase orders for the sale of $41,000 of 
stern's merchandise, which purchase orders had been accepted by 
astern. In his arrangement with Eastern, Spencer was entitled to 
eceive a commission of 10% on each sale. Within one month after 
e transfer of assets, Ideal filled all the purchase orders which 
d been obtained by Spencer. Spencer, who had lost his job as 
lesman when the assets were transferred by Eastern, requested of 
Sales Manager of Ideal that he be paid commissions totalling 
100. Such payment was refused. Shortly thereafter, Spencer 
ught an action against Ideal in the Law and Equity Court of the 
y of Richmond to recover damages of $4,100 for breach of contract, 
in his motion for judgment alleged the foregoing facts. In its 
unds of defense Ideal alleged that Spencer was not entitled to 
ver for breach of contract on the grounds (1) Spencer was not 
rty to the contract for sale of assetsj (2) Spencer was nowhere 
ioned or referred to in such contract; and (3) Spencer 
ributed. no consideration to such contract. 
Assuming that Ideal's three grounds are 
correct statements of fact, is Spencer entitled 
to recover for breach of contract? 
4. Douglas Fox was a widower who resided in Hanover 
Because of ill health he moved into a nursing home in 
.nd in March of 1965. Realizing· that he would probably not be · 
o return to Hanover county, on April 2, 1965, Fox executed 
i1vered to his son Pete a valid deed which, so far as material, 
d: 
,
11 ! hereby grant and convey to my son Pete Fox in fee 
~s8imple my farm in Hanover County, Virginia, containing 3 acres, but if my son Pete dies without issue 
~rviving him, then such farm shall become the property 
f my son Clyde Fox in fee simple • 11 
was promptly recorded. Pete Fox had worked on the farm 
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to the nursing home in Richmond. Clyde Fox had not lived on the 
farm in Hanover County for a number of years and was employed as 
a real estate salesman in the City of Richmond. Clyde Fox died 
intestate and without issue in 1967, survived by his widow Bertha. 
In May of 1968, Pete Fox decided to give up farming and, for a 
valuable consideration, executed and delivered a deed to David 
Black, ~hich deed ~ecited a conveyance of the farm to Black for life. 
Bertha Fox now consults you and asks what rights, if any, she, 
Pete Fox and David Black have in the farm. 
How should you advise her? 
5. Cassius Smith died in 1962 leaving a holographic will 
was duly probated, and which provided: 
"This is my last will. I hereby devise and bequeath 
to my sister Shirley Ball all of my property of 
every kind and description. She may deal with and 
dispose of my property in any way she mig~t desire, 
but if at her death any of my property may remain, 
it shall pass absolutely and in fee simple to my 
brother Hubert. 
(s) Cassius Smith" 
May of 1968, Shirley died intestate. By the time of her death 
had disposed of all property left her by Cassius except 475 
es of the common stock of General Motors Corporation. A 
roversy has now arisen between Hubert Smith and Sammy Ball, the 
son and sole heir and distributee of Shirley. Both Hubert and 
claim prior right to the 475 shares of common stock. 
Which should prevail? 
6. Sarah Tower was a widow who resided in the City of 
ricksburg. On June 12, 1968, while walking across a business 
intersection in Fredericksburg, Sarah Tower was instantly 
when struck by a motor vehicle. Sarah Tower left no will, 
r sole heir and distributee was her son, Ted Tower. Frank 
now comes to see you and says that he is the brother of Sarah 
and has lived with her for fourteen years; that on Christmas 
1967, Sarah Tower delivered to him, and he locked in a trunk 
bedroom, a small gold statue of the Virgin Mary; that at 
e she delivered the statue to him Sarah Tower said "You 
en more than a brother to me while you have lived here and · 
my appreciation, I make you a ~ift of this little statue 
ce belonged to our grandmotherW; and that Ted Tower is 
g that Frank south deliver over the small statue to him.· 
-4-
He then asks you whether he must surrender possession of the statue~ 
to Ted Tower. 
What should your answer be? 
7. When Defendant's car stalled at night in the northbound 
lane of a two-lane highway in Shenandoah county, Virginia, he sent 
for help to the nearby Zero Filling Station. He left his lights 
burning and turned on his signal light. Good Samaritan and Ever Do 
Well came on the scene and, without any request from the Defendant, 
offered to push his car onto the shoulder of the road. As they 
got behind the car to push it by hand, the truck of zero Filling 
station came up from the rear. The driver stopped so suddenly to 
void a collision that equipment and supplies on the truck fell off 
nd injured Good Samaritan. Zero Filling Station settled the 
esulting claim of Good Samaritan for $10,000 and brought a suit 
n a proper Virginia court against Defendant for contribution of 
5,000. In its complaint Zero alleged the above facts. Defendant 
emurred to the complaint. 
How should the Court rule on theciemurrer? 
8. Henry Jones, the 18-year-old son of John Jones, lived 
th his parents at their home in Roanoke. Henry borrowed from 
father the family automobile to take his date to a water-skiing 
ibition at Smith Mountain Lake in nearby Bedford county. As 
approached their destination, the automobile driven by Henry 
s collided in Bedford County with one driven by William Smith. 
cars were completely demolished. John Jones instituted an 
on against William Smith in the Circuit Court of Bedford 
ty for the damage to the farmer's automobile. William Smith 
proper counterclaim sought to recover for his property 
(A) If the accident was proximately caused by 
the concurring negligence of the two drivers, 
may John Jones recover from William Smith? 
(B) If the sole proximate cause of the accident 
was the negligence of Henry Jones, may William 
Smith recover from John Jones? 
9. Plaintiff Administrator brought an action in the Circuit 
Patrick County, Virginia, for the alleged wrongful death 
ecedent who had been a guest in an automobil~ operated by 
ndant in Patrick County. The evidence showed that , ... 
t' s driving ability· was impaired. ·by· his intoxication, and 





operation of the car, he continued to ride with Defendant after 
having had a reasonable opportunity to get out of the automobile. 
It was also shown that Plaintiff's decedent was a person of low . 
mentality who was capable of performing only the simplest of tasks, 
could not be trusted around machinery, and lacked iniative. There 
was no evidence, however, that he was insane or that a guardian had 
ever been appointed to care for his person or for his property. 
Defendant moved to strike Plaintiff's evidence and to enter 
summary judgment on the ground that the evidence showed as a matter 
of law that Plaintiff's decedent was guilty of contributory 
egligence which barred his recovery. In overruling the motion the 
trial court observed that Plaintiff had sought to show that his 
.ecedent was of low mentality and not able to recognize danger as 
t existed. The trial court concluded, therefore, that whether or 
ot Decedent was guilty of contributory negligence was a jury 
'l,lestion. 
On appeal Defendant assigned as error the action of the 
court in overruling his motion for summary~udgment. 
How ought the Court of Appeals to rule on the 
·assignment of error? \1. CC, 
10. In her motion for judgment in the Circuit Court of 
son County, Virginia, Plaintiff alleged that she ordered a 
in Defendant's restaurant in Grayson County on March 1, 1968; 
the Defendant impliedly warranted that the food served her was 
esome; that she was served food that was not wholesome; and that 
result of eating it she became ill from food poisoning. 
dant demurred to the motion for judgment on the ground that the 
S, alleged did not entitle Plaintiff to recover. 









VIRGINIA BOARD OF BAR EXAMINERS 
Roanoke, Virginia - June 24-25, 1968 
SECTION ONE 
1. A·' truck owned and operated by William Hill was involved 
a collision in the City of Richmond with a car owned and operated 
by Thomas Ravine. Ravine called upon Hill to pay him $10,000 
damages for personal injuries and for damage to his automobile. 
Rill and Ravine conferred at 2 p.m. on May 15, 1968, for the purpose 
of compromising Ravine's claim and effecting a settlement. During 
their discussion Hill said to Ravine: "I recognize that the 
'collision was my fault because I ran through a red light at the 
ntersection where the collision occurred." Although the parties 
onferred for over an hour in an effort to effect a compromise and 
ettlement they could not agree. Thereupon Ravine sued Hill in the 
ircuit Court of the City of Richmond to recover damages for his 
juries and for damage to his automobile. During the trial of 
e action Ravin~ who was the first witness to take the stand·, 
fered to testify that between the hours of 2 p.m. and 3 p.m. on 
y 15, 1968, Hill stated: "I recognize that the collision was my 
ylt because I ran through a red light at the intersection where 
e.collision occurred." Counsel for Hill objected to Ravine 
· tifying that Hill made the statement on the ground that the · 
tement was made during negotiations for compromise and settle-
t, and that-the evidence was therefore not admissible. 
How should the Court rule on the objection? 
2. Hannibal Richman entered into a written contract at 
on March 20, 1968, with Gilder Lily by the terms of which 
an agreed to purchase from Lily all of the materials to be . 
in constructing a swimming pool and bathhouse on Richman's 
e known as 11 Sunset Hill". In aqdi tion to providing for the 
of delivery,. the purchase price to be paid and the quantity 
uality of the materials to be furnished, the written contract 
'ned the following provision: 
"This contract constitutes the entire agreement 
between the parties hereto, it being expressly under-
stood that there are no representations, commitments 
or statements by the parties except as provided herein. 11 
the materials, meeting the specifications required by the 
:t, were delivered by Lily to "sunset Hill" by the date 










presented Richman with a bill and demanded payment. Richman 
refused payment, claiming that he would pay the bill only after 
Lily had constructed the pool and the bathhouse as he agreed to 
do on the morning of March 20, whereupon Lily sued Richman to 
recover the value-of the materials delivered. In his grounds of 
defense Richman stated that he did not owe for the materials 
furnished, as Lily had not constructed the pool and bathhouse as he 
had orally contracted to do on the morning of March 20, 1968. 
During the trial of the action Richman offered to prove that he 
entered into an oral contract with Lily the morning of March 20, 
1968, by the terms of which Lily agreed to construct the pool and 
bathhouse at "sunset Hill", Lily agreed to complete the construction 
by May 25, 1968, and Richman agreed to pay for all materials 
furnished for the construction of the pool and bathhouse ten days 
··after completion of construction. Richman also offered to prove 
that Lily had not commenced construction nor had he made any attempt 
to complete the construction by the date agreed upon. Counsel for 
Lily objected to this evidence on the ground that this evidence would 
violate the parol evidence rule. 
How should the Court rule on the-objection? 
3, Sally Wheel commenced an action in the Circuit Court of 
ampbell County, Virginia, against Joe Motorist to recover damages 
gr personal injuries growing out of an automobile collision. 
torist filed grounds of defense denying the averments of negligence 
ntained in the motion for judgment and he also filed a plea of 
ntributory negligence in which he set out the particulars thereof, 
t the plea contained no request for a reply thereto. Sally 
eel filed no written response to the plea of contributory 
ligence. Thirty days after the plea was filed, Motorist filed 
ritten motion for summary judgment. 
How should the Court rule on the motion? 
4. Moonlight Construction Company, Inc. commenced an action 
w in the Circuit Court of Roanoke County, Virginia, against 
s Ashton to recover damages for breach of a written contract. 
g the pendency of the action and before trial, Thomas Ashton 
and his son, Jerry Ashton, was appointed and qualified as 
istrator of his estate. Plaintiff, fearing that the action wil: 
because of the death of the defendant, consults its attorney 
nquires whether the action may be prosecuted to a conclusion 
ether a new action must be commenced. 
What should plaintiff's attorney advise, 













5. In an action tried in the Circuit Court of Orange 
county, Virginia, defendant moved to strike plaintiff 1 s evidence 
at the conclusion thereof, assigning grounds therefor, which motion 
the court overruled and the defendant's exception was noted. There-
upon defendant proceeded to introduce evidence in his own behalf, 
and at the conclusion thereof defendant again moved to strike 
plaintiff's evidence, assigning the same grounds therefor. The 
latter motion was overruled and the defendant's exception was noted. 
The jury hearing the case reported to the court that it could not 
agree upon a verdict. Whereupon the jury was discharged. Promptly 
after the discharge of the jury, the defendant again moved the 
court to strike the plaintiff's evidence, and enter judgment for 
defendant, assigning the same grounds he had assigned in support 
of the two previous motions. 
May the Court entertain the motion to 
strike after the jury has been discharged? 
6. White Trucking Lines, Inc., commenced an action in the 
ited States District Court for the Western Dis~rict of Virginia 
ainst Red Streak Trucking Lines, Inc., for the purpose of setting 
ide a contract between the parties upon the ground of fraud.· 
e complaint filed by plaintiff did not contain an averment of the 
ts of fraud alleged to have been practiced by defendant but merely 
arged that: "The contract was entered into by plaintiff as a 
ult of fraud practiced by defendant." The defendant desired to 
llenge the sufficiency of the complaint. 
(a) How may he do this, and 
(b) How should the Court rule on the 
challenge? 
7. During the trial of a criminal prosecution in the 
Court of Roanoke County, Virginia, the Commonwealth 
ed evidence to prove the commission of the offense but did not 
.... evidence to prove that the offense had been committed in 
ke County. After the attorney for the Commonwealth had rested 
se, the accused moved the Court to strike the evidence of the 
wealth on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to 
fy the accused as the party who committed the offense. The 
was overruled and the exception of the accused was noted. 
cused offered no evidence in his own behalf. A verdict of 
was returned by the jury. The accused thereupon moved to 
ide the verdict on the ground that the Commonwealth failed to 
hat the offense had been committed in Roanoke County. 








8. Alfred Thomas, who resided in the City of Richmond, 
was the owner of a tract of land in Alleghany County, Virginia, 
where he spent each spring vacation. When he went to Alleghany 
county in May of 1968, he found that his neighbor, Paul Word, had 
been continually walking across the tract in order to catch a 
passenger bus on U. s. Route 60 which daily took him to Covington 
where he was employed. Thomas told Word that he must stop walking 
across the tract, but Word replied that he would not do so, and 
would continue his customary route as long as he retained his job 
in Covington. Thomas, through you as his attorney, thereupon filed 
against Word in the Circuit Court of Alleghany County a sworn bill 
of complaint alleging the foregoing facts and praying that the court 
enjoin Word from further trespassing across the property of Thomas. 
Word has filed an answer to the bill in which he admits its 
:allegations, but further recites in his ·answer that he is partially 
crippled by arthritis, that his customary route across the property 
of Thomas is shorter than walking over his own land to reach the 
ighway to catch the passenger bus, and that he has followed the 
oute over Thomas' land on the advice of his doctor. His answer 
hen prays that the bill of Thomas be dismissed. You properly 
dvise Thomas that you believe the defense asserted by Word is not 
cod. Thomas then asks you by what procedural methods, if any, he 
· ght obtain the injunction against Word without being required to 
cur the e.xpense -and delay resulting from extended litigation. 
What should your answer be? 
9. On May 1, 1968, John Good obtained a judgment for 
against Sam Park in the Circuit Court of Appomattox County, 
ch judgment the Clerk promptly recorded on the judgment lien 
et. The judgment did not contain a provision staying its 
ct pending any appeal that might be sought by Park. On June 
Park filed with the Circuit Court an appropriate notice of 
l and assignments of error, and delivered a copy thereof to 
• Park now comes to see you and says that he has just been 
d with a subpoena in chancery having an attached bill of 
aint by which Good has commenced a creditor's suit against 
to obtain a sale of timber land owned by Park in Appomattox 
Y in satisfaction of the lien of "the judgment of May 1st. 
sks you what procedural steps he should take in an effort 
vent a sale of his timber land in the creditor's suit. 
What should your answer be? 
~ 
10. In January, 1952 Conrad, a Florida resident, duly 
d a judgment in Florida against Dabney, a west Virginia 
~ for damages for personal injuries sustained by Conrad 
lng out of an accident in Florida. Conrad duly docketed 





that a judgment, if docketed, is enforceable for 15 years from the 
date of judgment and cannot thereafter be enforced, whereas the 
corresponding period in Virginia is 20 years. Dabney moved to 
Roanoke, Virginia, in 1965. Conrad, having failed to enforce the 
judgment in Florida, brought an action against Dabney on the 
judgment in the Hustings Court of the City of Roanoke, Virginia, on 
June 20, 1968. 
Dabney consults you as to whether he has any defense to 
action. 





·and incurred no expense in obtaining the award. 
He consults you as to the proper Federal Income Tax 
treatment of the proceeds. What would you advise 
-(a) ~rn:-~X'egard to the $400 per acre for the land 
taken? 
(b) In regard to the $8,000 for damages to the residue? 
. I 
', ·'.1 
.. ; I 1 
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The company refused payment in that amount, and offered to pay the 
sum of six hundred dollars, being one-fifth of the amount otherwise 
payable. The beneficiary refused to accept that amount and sued 
the company to recover three thousand dollars, contending that the 
company could not contest its obligation to pay according to the 
schedule contained in the policy. In support of this contention 
the beneficiary r&~ied upon the provision of the Virginia statute 
which provides that a policy of life insurance shall be incontestable 
"for any cause after it shall have been in force during the lifetime 
of the insured for two years from its date. 11 
Is the contention of the beneficiary sound, 
and may she recover the sum of three thousand 
dollars? 
~. An ordinance of a City ±n Virginia controlling the grant-
ng or denial of permits for the erection of gasoline service 
ations provides: 
"The application for a permit shall be filed with 
the Commissioner of the Revenue arid by him 
presented to the Council for its approval or disapproval. 
If, upop consideration of the application, the Council 
finds that the public safety would be endangered by 
the filling station for which application is made, the 
Council shall, by ordinance, refuse to grant a permit." 
hearing and consideration of an application for a permit, the 
of the City refused to grant a permit to Tex Phillips, not 
ause servic~ stations are inherently dangerous but because the 
ts consi~ered by the Council showed that the public would be 
cessarily endangered if the service station were erected and 
rated. Phillips thereupon filed a bill in chancery attacking the 
stitutionality of the section of the foregoing ordinance under 
ch the request was denied, and praying that the City be required 
ssue the permit. 
Should ~hillips prevail? 






Acre, containing 200 acres without buildings or other improve-
• The Highway Department has condemned 10 acres, for which 
ondemnation Commissioners awarded $400 per acre, or a total of ,, 
O, for the land taken, and the same Commissioners also awarded 
for damages to the residue. Oppressed paid, several years 
300 per acre for the land. He was not represented by counsel 
'i ~ .)- '""/'O 
VIRGINIA BOARD OF BAR EXAMINERS 
Richmond, Virginia - December 9-10, 1968 
Clo~.:,4 
~~ 
61'~~ Willie Winkle, a 20 year old high school student, inherited 
$5,000 from his uncle. Short~y after receiving the money he 
requested Tom Ruby to purchase for him a $2,500 diamond ring that 
he pia'ffiied to give to his girl friend as an engagement ring. Winkle 
first met Ruby when he was introduced to him by a friend at the 
time he requested him to purchase the ring on his behalf. Ruby, 
believing that Winkle was an adult, purchased the desired ring at a 
jewelry store in a city some distance from Winkle's home town. At 
the time of the purchase Ruby told the manager of the store that he 
was not buying the ring for himself but was acting as the agent of 
illie Winkle, and that he knew that Winkle was able to pay for it 
ecause he had just inherited $5,000. He stated that Winkle 
ssured him that he would pay for the ring the day he received it. 
inkle did not pay for the ring, and ten days after the sale the 
nager of the jewelry store called on Winkle and demanded payment. 
that time Winkle told him that the girl had rejected his proposal 
marriage and he offered the ring back to him, stating that he 
fused to pay for it. The manager of the jewelry store consults 
u, advising that he did not know that Willie Winkle was an infant 
the time of thapurchase, and that Ruby made no representations 
him respecting Winkle's age. 
~'0\,0 
0 May the jewelry company successfully prosecute 
an action against Tom Ruby to recover the valui: fl e) ) 
of the ring? If D ··~A~ ai ... M <S 3 'j; o.N f ~ C r-/1- ' 
2. By a written contract, bearing date October· 1, 1968, 
Vermouth agreed to sell to Peter Gin an antique liquor chest. 
aterial provisions of the contract were: 
"Vermouth agrees to sell his antique liquor chest 
to Peter Gin for the sum of $300. Peter Gin agrees 
to pay the purchase price 30 days from the date of the 
contract, that being the date of delivery. Before 
delivery, Paul Vermouth agrees that he will repair 
and completely refinish the liquor chest at his own 
expense." 
.. on October 15, 1968, after the chest had been refinished by 
th, Vermouth i·eceived a letter from Gin, in which Gin 
,ca.1i..v stated that he had decided not to take the liquor chest 
,, 
I 
I I 
